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ABSTRACT
According to some economists, central banks should use ‘helicopter money’ to boost inﬂation (expec-
tations). Based on a survey among Dutch households, we examine whether respondents would spend
the money received via such a transfer. Our results show that respondents expect to spend about 30%
of the transfer and that helicopter money would hardly aﬀect inﬂation expectations. Furthermore,
whether transfers come from the central bank or the government makes no diﬀerence. Finally, our









At the end of 2014, inﬂation in the euro area dropped
below zero and thereafter inﬂation remained persis-
tently low for several years and well below the
European Central Bank’s (ECB) aim of price stability
(i.e. an inﬂation rate in themedium term of below but
close to 2%). At the same time, market-based long-
term inﬂation expectations became less well anchored
and started drifting away from this target (see de
Haan et al. 2016 for a discussion).
In January 2015, the Governing Council of the
European Central Bank, therefore, decided to launch
the expanded asset purchase program (EAPP), better
known as quantitative easing (QE). Several observers
have expressed doubts that the ECB’s QE will achieve
the desired sustained adjustment of inﬂation (expec-
tations) in line with the ECB’s aim for price stability
(see Blinder et al. 2017 for a discussion). Some econ-
omists have therefore suggested the ECB to use ‘heli-
copter money’, i.e. the monetary ﬁnancing of
government expenditure or transfers to households.1
According to Borio, Disyatat, and Zabai (2016), ‘heli-
copter money is best regarded as an increase in eco-
nomic agents’ nominal purchasing power in the form
of a permanent addition to their money balances.’
In a hearing in the European Parliament, ECB
PresidentDraghi said: “It’s a very interesting concept
that is now being discussed by academic economists
and in various environments. . . .. but of course by
this term “helicopter money” one may mean many
diﬀerent things, and so we have to see that.” The
purpose of our article is to examine whether one
form of helicopter money (i.e. a transfer to house-
holds) would aﬀect private spending and raise inﬂa-
tion expectations.
Most proponents of helicopter money are not
very speciﬁc about how helicopter money can be
created. An exception is Muellbauer (2014), who
suggests providing ‘all workers and pensioners
with social-security numbers (or the local equiva-
lent) with a payment from the ECB’. In his view, it
is to be preferred that the ECB is responsible
instead of the government: ‘There is an important
diﬀerence between the ECB implementing
a €500 per-adult-citizen hand-out as part of
monetary policy and governments doing this as
traditional ﬁscal policy. Economists have long
worried about myopic politicians over-spending,
for example, just before an election in order to
inﬂuence the voters and thus creating a “political”
business cycle, or simply perpetually spending too
much, and as a result running too high govern-
ment deﬁcits. . . . But it is quite a diﬀerent matter
for an independent central bank . . . to directly
hand out cash to households as part of its method
of meeting its inﬂation mandate.’ We take this
speciﬁc proposal for helicopter money as the start-
ing point for our research.
CONTACT Jakob de Haan jakob.de.haan@rug.nl De Nederlandsche Bank, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
1See, for instance, Buiter (2014), Turner (2015) and Bernanke (2016). See also Reichlin, Turner, and Woodford (2013) and Karakas (2016) for overviews. Peter
Praet, a member of the ECB’s Governing Council, noted, ‘All central banks can do it. The question is, if and when is it opportune.’ According to Richard
Clarida, ‘We will see a variant of helicopter money (perhaps thinly disguised) in the next 10 years if not the next ﬁve.’ (Both cited in Ipp 2016).
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A crucial question is whether such a central bank
ﬁnanced transfer would, in fact, lead to higher con-
sumer spending and therefore – via its eﬀects on
aggregate demand – to higher inﬂation (expecta-
tions). We examine this issue by asking a panel of
Dutch households whether they intend to spend the
money received. To analyse whether the amount of
the transfer matters, we ask this question for two
amounts, namely €500 and €2000. In addition, we
test whether it makes a diﬀerence whether the money
would be distributed by the ECB or national govern-
ments as suggested by Muellbauer (2014).
The announcement of helicopter money may also
have a direct eﬀect on inﬂation expectations. For
instance, when individuals expect that the majority
of households would spend the money transfers,
these individuals may raise their inﬂation expecta-
tions accordingly, even when they do not intend to
spend their helicoptermoney themselves. As a result,
even when only a small part of money transfers is
actually spent, helicopter money could be eﬀective in
raising inﬂation expectations among the public.
Similarly, it may aﬀect inﬂation expectations via
a signalling eﬀect, i.e. the use of helicopter money
emphasises the commitment ofmonetary authorities
to their inﬂation target. We therefore also examine
whether a transfer to households would aﬀect their
inﬂation expectations.
A related question is how helicopter transfers,
which would be a new monetary policy instrument,
would impact public trust in the ECB. Public trust in
the ECB is important because central banks ‘ulti-
mately derive their democratic legitimacy from the
public’s trust in them’ (Ehrmann, Soudan, and
Stracca 2013).Moreover, high public trust contributes
to an eﬀective functioning of the ECB, for instance, by
contributing to the credibility of communication
(Blinder et al. 2008) or to anchoring the public’s
inﬂation expectations (Christelis et al. 2016). We
therefore also examine how helicopter money aﬀects
trust in the ECB.
Our results show that respondents expect to spend
about 30% of a helicopter transfer instead of using the
full amount to increase spending. Whether the trans-
fers come from the ECB or the government makes no
diﬀerence. Furthermore, helicopter money would
hardly aﬀect inﬂation expectations. Finally, our results
suggest that using helicopter money would have
mixed consequences for public trust in the ECB.
Two recent papers that were independently written
at about the same time as our study deal with similar
issues. Djuric and Neugart (2016) ﬁelded questions in
a survey which constitutes a representative sample of
the German population. They randomly divided par-
ticipants into four sub-groups which were confronted
with distinct versions of unconventional monetary
and ﬁscal policy scenarios. These authors report that
on average subjects indicated that they would spend
451 Euros when the central bank makes a one-time
helicopter money drop of 1200 euros. They do not
examine whether helicopter money would aﬀect trust
in the ECB. Similar to our ﬁndings, the authors report
that it hardly matters whether the central bank would
print the money and transfer it directly to the house-
holds or whether the Treasury would borrow the
money from the central bank and transfer it to the
households.
A recent study by ING comes to similar conclu-
sions as the present study (Bright and Janssen 2017).
Almost 12,000 people in 12 countries across Europe
(including the UK) were asked how they would spend
€2400 (which theywould not have to repay); the study
reports that only 26% of the respondents say they
would spend most of the money. For the
Netherlands, the authors report that 29% of the
respondents answer that they would spend most of
themoney received. According to our results, respon-
dents expect to spend about 30% of the transfer. Also,
the ING study does not examine whether the amount
received matters and whether helicopter money
would aﬀect trust in the ECB; the study also does
not provide an empirical model to explain respon-
dents’ replies. Furthermore, we have some doubts
about the setup of this research. The most important
question asked is: “Imagine you received €200 in your
bank account each month, for a year. You are free to
do what you want with the money and don’t need to
repay it or pay taxes on it. How would you use this
extramoney?”Thepossible answers provided include:
‘save or invest most of it’ and ‘spendmost of it’. These
answers are very imprecise, whichmay seriously aﬀect
the outcomes. In our survey people are asked to dis-
tribute the amount received over various categories
which provides a more accurate view about how heli-
copter money would be spent.
The remainder of the article is structured as fol-
lows. Section 2 compares the impact of QE and heli-
copter money on the real economy; it also reviews
6172 M. VAN ROOIJ AND J. DE HAAN
evidence that may be relevant in assessing whether
helicopter money would work. Section 3 outlines the
survey and Section 4 presents and discusses the out-
comes of our survey. Section 5 concludes.
II. QE versus helicopter money
There is a major diﬀerence between QE and transfers
ﬁnanced by the central bank. The transmission of QE
to the real economy is indirect, i.e. it runs via ﬁnancial
markets and institutions. In contrast, transfers into
people’s accounts would directly inﬂuence private
sector agents’ spending capacity rather than hoping
for a trickle-down eﬀect from ﬁnancial markets and
institutions. Furthermore, it would be targeted to
people having a higher marginal propensity to spend
than the wealthy owning the assets whose prices are
boosted by QE (Muellbauer 2014).
Althoughmost evidence, whichmostly refers to the
US, suggests that ﬁnancial markets were aﬀected in
the intended direction by central banks’ asset pur-
chase programs (see Blinder et al. 2017; de Haan and
Sturm 2019 for discussion of the evidence), this does
not necessarily imply that these unconventional poli-
cies have been able to increase inﬂation or inﬂation
expectations. Indeed, several Fed policymakers, have
noted that the transmission channels of QE to the real
economy are not well understood and that estimates
are subject to substantial uncertainty (cf. Rosengren
2015; Williams 2014).
And even if QE may have ‘worked’ for the US,
some arguments have been raised why this may be
less obvious for the euro area. For instance, the impact
of asset purchase programs may diﬀer depending on
economic settings, such as the steepness of the yield
curve at the time when the program is announced
(Blinder et al. 2017). Note that when the ECB decided
to introduce QE, the yield curve was already fairly ﬂat
due to previous ECB unconventional policies.
In a speech inNovember 2002, former chairman of
the Federal Reserve, Ben Bernanke (2002), suggested
helicopter money as one means to boost the econ-
omy. Proponents of helicopter money argue that if
a central bank wants to raise inﬂation and output in
an economy that is running substantially below
potential, one of the most eﬀective tools would be
simply to give everyone direct money transfers. In
theory, people would see this as a permanent one-oﬀ
expansion of the amount of money in circulation and
would spend it, thereby increasing economic activity
and helping to push inﬂation back up to the central
bank’s target.
According to Buiter (2014), a helicopter drop of
money is a permanent and irreversible increase in
the nominal stock of ﬁat base money in contrast to
QE. However, a helicopter drop may imply that
central banks’ dividends paid to the government
would be reduced or that the government would
have to transfer money to the central bank to
cover episodes of negative net income (Reis
2015). Under those circumstances, helicopter-
money-ﬁnanced transfers may not be as perma-
nent as suggested by its proponents. And to the
extent that consumers are Ricardian, the transfer
may then not lead to higher private consumption.
Furthermore, as households are currently highly
leveraged in several countries in the euro area,
they might decide to use the money received to
improve their net asset position.
Proponents of helicopter money argue that it
would boost demand even if existing government
debt is already high and/or interest rates are zero or
negative (Buiter 2014; Gali 2014). Bernanke (2016)
identiﬁes four channels through which helicopter
money would stimulate demand: 1. the direct eﬀects
of the public works spending on GDP, jobs, and
income in case government spending is ﬁnanced by
money creation; 2. the increase in household income,
which should induce greater consumer spending in
case helicopter money takes the form of a transfer to
households; 3. a temporary increase in expected inﬂa-
tion due to the increase in themoney supply, which in
turn should incentivise spending; and 4. unlike debt-
ﬁnanced ﬁscal programs, a money-ﬁnanced program
does not increase future tax burdens and so should
provide a greater impetus to household spending than
expansionary ﬁscal policy ﬁnanced by government
debt. However, the extent to which these eﬀects mate-
rialise is an empirical question.
Would helicoptermoney in the formof transfers to
households work?2 Due to lack of prior use of the
policy instrument, proponents often refer to related
2English, Erceg, and Lopez-Salido (2017) explore the possible eﬀects of such policies. While they do ﬁnd that money-ﬁnanced ﬁscal programs could provide signiﬁcant
stimulus, they underscore the risks that would be associated with such a program. These risks include persistently high in inﬂation if the central bank fully adhered to
the program; or alternatively, that such a programwould be ineﬀective in providing stimulus if the public doubted the central bank’s commitment to such a strategy.
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experiences with tax rebates in the US, Australia and
Singapore.
Johnson, Parker, and Souleles (2006) report that
between 20 and 40% of the 2001 US rebate was spent
in the quarter in which the cash was received – and
about another third in the quarter afterwards. In their
study of the 2008 US rebate Parker et al. (2013) con-
clude that households spent 12–30% (depending on
the speciﬁcation) of their payments on nondurable
goods during the 3-month in which payments were
received, and a signiﬁcant amount more on durable
goods, primarily vehicles, bringing the total response
to 50–90%of the payments. Similarly, in an analysis of
the 2008 US rebate using ACNielsenHomescan data,
Broda and Parker (2008) ﬁnd a ﬁrst-quarter marginal
propensity to consume of about 0.6 and a two-quarter
marginal propensity to consume of about 1.
In his study of the Australian 2008/09 tax rebate,
called a ‘bonus’, Leigh (2012) reports that 40% of
households who said that they received a payment
reported having spent it, while 24% indicated they
had saved the money and almost 36% used it to pay
oﬀ debt.
Agarwal and Qian (2014) ﬁnd an average marginal
propensity to spend of 0.8 within 10 months of the
announcement of an unanticipated one-time cash
pay-out which ranged from $78 to $702 per person
in Singapore. This ﬁscal stimulus of $ 1.17 billion
amounted to 0.5% of Singapore’s annual GDP in
2011, and was equivalent to 12% of Singapore’s
monthly aggregate household consumption expendi-
ture in 2011. The authors also ﬁnd that consumption
rose primarily in small durable goods, while consu-
mers with low liquid assets or with low credit card
limit showed stronger consumption responses. They
also report a strong announcement eﬀect: 19% of the
response occurs during the ﬁrst two-month
announcement period.
There is also a related literature on how people
spend money won in a lottery. A good example is
the study by Fagereng, Holm, andNatvik (2016), who
report a 6-month average marginal propensity to
spend from lottery wins of 0.35 for the population of
Norway. They also ﬁnd variation across the amount
won (the marginal propensity to spend among the
25% winning least is twice as high as among the 25%
winning most) and the amount of liquid assets that
price winners have. Even more related to our work is
the study byKuhn et al. (2011)who study the eﬀects of
lottery prices on spending in the Netherlands. These
authors do not detect any eﬀect of winning a prize
(€12,500 per lottery ticket) on most components of
winning households’ expenditures, except for spend-
ing on cars and other durables.
As Muellbauer (2014) points out, most evidence
discussed above contradicts simple textbook versions
of the permanent income hypothesis of consumption.
Referring to some of his previous work (Aron et al.
2012; Chauvin and Muellbauer 2013), he concludes
that ‘between 40 and 60%of a surprise transfer of €500
would be spent fairly quickly.’He also argues that this
percentage would depend on the net asset position of
households. For instance, liquidity constrained house-
holds tend to have higher propensities to consume in
response to income shocks (Jappelli and Pistaferri
2010, 2014; Kaplan and Violante 2014). This would
suggest that the spending impact would be less in
Germany, where many households already have a lot
in their saving accounts, but in Spain, Portugal, and
Greece, where many households are perhaps more
liquidity-constrained, the eﬀects would be large.3
Note however that Muellbauer’s estimates of quick
and substantial spending out of surprise transfers are
not unchallenged. For instance, recent research by
Fuster, Kaplan, and Zafar (2018) ﬁnds for the US
a mean marginal propensity to spend out of a $500
transfer within three months of 8%. In their survey,
three-quarters of respondents do not intend to change
spending at all after a one-time $500 payment and
some indicate they would reduce spending.
III. The survey
To investigate the willingness of consumers to spend
helicopter money and whether helicopter money
aﬀects inﬂation expectations and trust in the ECB,
we have designed a survey. This survey has been
ﬁelded among the members of the CentERpanel.
The CentERpanel is an internet panel run by
CentERdata, a survey research institute aﬃliated
3D’Acunto, Hoang, and Weber (2016) examined how German households reacted when the German government announced in November 2005 an unexpected
3-percentage-point increase in value-added tax (VAT) that would become eﬀective in 2007. Households’willingness to purchase durables increased by 34% after the
shock, compared to before and tomatched households in other European countries that were not exposed to the VAT shock. Hayo andUhl (2017) also study the eﬀect
of an exogenous tax reduction in Germany using survey data and ﬁnd that high-income households are more likely to increase spending in response to tax changes.
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withTilburgUniversity. The composition of the panel
is representative of the Dutch-speaking population.
Recruitment is based on a random national sample.
The initial selection interview takes place via tradi-
tional communication channels (mail, telephone or
house visits). Once participants conﬁrm their willing-
ness to participate in the panel, they are explained that
the surveys are done via the internet and that partici-
pants without internet access are granted access by
CentERdata. The careful selection procedure makes
sure that also the part of the population that is not yet
connected to the Internet is represented in the panel
(see Teppa and Vis 2012). As there is no intervention
of an interviewer, respondents can answer questions
at their own pace and convenience.
Annually, panel members complete six survey
modules on work, income, health, assets and debt,
and economic and psychological savings concepts.
This longitudinal dataset, known as the DNB
Household Survey (DHS), provides a rich set of back-
ground information onpanelmembers. In addition to
the annual surveys, participants in the CentERpanel
regularly complete ad hoc surveys on a variety of
topics designed by researchers for speciﬁc research
projects. Data collected via the CentERpanel have
been used in several studies such as Christelis et al.
(2018), Van Ooijen and van Rooij (2016), Van der
Cruijsen, Jansen, and de Haan (2015), and Van Rooij
et al. (2011, 2012).
From 13 until 24 May 2016, our questionnaire was
oﬀered to all panel members aged 18 and older.
Compared to traditional surveys conducted by tele-
phone or mail, the response rate to surveys in this
Internet household panel is usually quite high. In our
case, 2223 out of 2848 respondents completed the
survey which gives a response rate of 78.1%.
We merge the data from our survey with informa-
tion from the 2015DHSmodules. This enables amore
extensive analysis of the survey data, but note that the
number of observations for these additional variables
is about 400 less than for our survey because there is
not a one-to-one correspondence between partici-
pants in the surveys. Speciﬁcally, we include informa-
tion on the level and composition of household
wealth. Net household wealth is measured as the net
value of ﬁnancial and real assets and debts. The mea-
surement of wealth follows a bottom-up approach,
where households ﬁrst report whether they own sev-
eral assets or debt items and if so they are asked to
report the asset and debt values item by item (see
Alessie, Hochguertel, and van Soest (2002) for
a detailed description of the construction of house-
hold wealth using the DHSmodules.) Before ﬁlling in
the asset and debt module, respondents are kindly
requested to gather ﬁnancial records and income tax
ﬁles so that they can easily access the relevant ﬁnancial
information. For the value of the house, which repre-
sents a large proportion of wealth for many house-
holds, respondents typically have to come up with
their own estimate. While these subjective self-
reports may contain measurement error, it is self-
estimated wealth that most likely aﬀects spending
decisions (as pointed out by Christelis, Georgarakos,
and Jappelli 2015). Note that collective pension sav-
ings are not included in the measure of household
wealth because respondents do not have an individual
claim on the collective pension investments of their
pension fund. However, to take into account that
manyworkers compulsory save in collective company
pension plans (as to supplement the pay-as-you-go
state pension beneﬁts), we include a dummy for pen-
sion fund membership in the empirical analysis.
Table 1 provides information on the respondents’
gender, age, education, gross monthly income,
wealth, education level, whether they are living with
a partner, their social status, and where they live. The
average respondent turns out to be male, in his early
50s, and living with a partner. Compared to the
Dutch population our sample of respondents is
more educated on average. Correspondingly, respon-
dents with high income and high wealth are some-
what overrepresented. For instance, 44% of the
respondents have a gross personal income in the
highest tertile of the population-wide distribution.
Therefore, we use non-response weights throughout
the article in order to present ﬁndings that are repre-
sentative of the Dutch population in terms of gender,
age, education, and income.
Appendix 1 lists our main survey questions and
explains the survey structure. The ﬁrst questions ask
what respondents would do if they were to receive
a transfer (either €500 or €2000) from the ECB or the
national government. The options given are: donate
the money, spend it, save it, invest it, use it for down
payments on debt (such as mortgages) or use it for
another purpose. Respondents were asked to allocate
the money received over these categories. They also
could choose ‘I do not know’. Similar to Jappelli and
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Pistaferri (2014), we do not specify the horizon in our
survey questions. Subsequent analysis shows that add-
ing a 12 months horizon to the question does not
aﬀect our main ﬁndings (results available on request).
The survey also contained several questions per-
taining to respondents’ knowledge. For instance, we
asked whether respondents are aware of QE, heard
about the concept of helicopter money, know the
name of the ECB President, and can identify the
main objective of the ECB. This allows us to test
whether respondents’ knowledge is related to their
answers on how they intend to allocate the money
received. In the questionnaire, we stressed that there
was no need to search for the correct answers (see
Appendix 1). We explicitly mentioned that partici-
pants should not worry about giving an incorrect
answer. By including these comments, we wanted to
minimise the likelihood that people would use inter-
net sources (such as the ECB website) to search for
information while completing the survey. Of course,
we cannot exclude that people searched for correct
answers. Still, searching for the answers to these ques-
tions would have taken quite some time. Also, we did
not oﬀer participants any monetary incentives for
answering questions correctly and survey responses
are anonymous so that it is not possible for researchers
to link the number of correct answers or other perso-
nal information to individuals. Therefore, it seems
unlikely that a signiﬁcant portion of the respondents
engaged in searching behaviour.
IV. Results
Would respondents spend the money received?
Tables 2 and 3 show the distribution of the answers to
the questions about how the respondents would allo-
cate a helicopter money transfer (averages as well as
percentiles of the distribution).We draw four conclu-
sions from these results. First, the largest part of the
money received would be saved (i.e. put on a saving
account or used for debt redemption). For instance,
out of a money transfer of €500 by the ECB, on
average €220 would be saved and €50 would be used
for debt redemption.
Second, the share of the transfers received that
would be spent on average drops from about 34 to
28% if the size of the transfer increases from €500 to
€2000. Thus, the marginal eﬀectiveness of a money
transfer in terms of money spent decreases with the
Table 1. Sample statistics.
Mean Median Minimum Maximum N
Male 0.53 1 0 1 2223
Age 54.3 56 18 93 2223
High education 0.39 0 0 1 2223
Gross personal income
Low 0.27 0 0 1 2165
Intermediate 0.30 0 0 1 2165
High 0.44 0 0 1 2165
Household net wealth
Low 0.25 0 0 1 1641
Intermediate 0.34 0 0 1 1641
High 0.42 0 0 1 1641
Liquid assets
Low 0.33 0 0 1 1648
Intermediate 0.40 0 0 1 1648
High 0.27 0 0 1 1648
Pension fund member 0.71 1 0 1 1735
Homeowner 0.72 1 0 1 2223
Has under water mortgage 0.08 0 0 1 1695
Lives with partner 0.74 1 0 1 2223
Social status (1 = very low, 5 = very high) 3.61 4 1 5 2217
Urbanization (1 = very low, 5 = very high) 3.01 3 1 5 2198
Age ismeasured in years; other variables are 0–1 dummies, unless indicated otherwise. High education indicates that the respondent completed a higher vocational
training or university. Gross personal income, household net worth and liquid assets are divided into three subgroups according to the tertiles in the population
distribution. Household netwealth includes ﬁnancial and real assets net of ﬁnancial andmortgage debt. This deﬁnition does not include collective pension savings,
but the pension fund member dummy indicates membership (active or passive) of pension funds (or insurance companies) taking care of collective pension
savings plans organised at the company or sectoral level. Liquid assets are divided into three groups according to the percentage share of gross ﬁnancial assets in
total gross assets. Respondents have an ‘under water’ mortgage (negative equity) if their mortgage loan exceeds the value of their home. The social-economic
status of the respondent is originally deﬁned by Statistics Netherlands and takes a person’s profession into account and whether he has a managing position and
for how many employees. Urbanization measures whether a respondent lives in a rural area (less than 500 homes per squared kilometre; urbanization = 1) or in
a very strongly urbanised area (more than 2500 homes per squared kilometre; urbanization = 5).
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size of the transfer.4 In fact, respondents state that they
intend to use a larger part of the money transfer for
other purposes such as redeeming debt and – to
a lesser extent – for donations or investments.
Third, as shown in Figure 1, these averages mask
a large heterogeneity in individual responses. This
ﬁgure shows the distribution of responses to a €2000
transfer from the ECB in a histogram with 10 equally
sized bins of €200. For instance, over 20% of respon-
dents save (almost) nothing and over 10% of respon-
dents save (almost) the full money transfer. Focusing
on the smaller €500 money transfer (instead of
€2000), we ﬁnd comparable levels of heterogeneity
across individuals’ marginal propensities to spend as
shown in Figure 2.
Finally, it does not make any diﬀerence whether
respondents would receive the transfer from the ECB
or the national government. As shown in Table 2,
diﬀerences in the average allocations are economically
small and statistically insigniﬁcant. The latter ﬁnding,
therefore, does not support Muellbauer’s (2014) view
that a helicopter money transfer via the central bank
would be more eﬀective than a helicopter money
transfer via the government.
Do knowledge, income and wealth matter?
The way consumers respond to a helicopter money
transfer may depend on their knowledge of the
current economic situation and the ECB or on
their personal ﬁnancial situation. In fact, evidence
suggests that economic and ﬁnancial knowledge is
an important determinant of many economic deci-
sions (Lusardi and Mitchell 2014). For example,
studies have documented a relation between knowl-
edge and the decision to enter stock markets (Van
Table 2. Allocation of helicopter transfer.
(Weighted average allocation in euros; percentages of total amount in parentheses)
€500 received from ECB €500 received from government €2000 received from ECB €2000 received from government
Save it 220 (44) 219 (44) 828 (41) 837 (42)
Spend it 172 (34) 173 (35) 556 (28) 542 (27)
Use it for debt redemption 50 (10) 48 (10) 320 (16) 323 (16)
Donate it 33 (7) 34 (7) 153 (8) 151 (8)
Invest it 9 (2) 10 (2) 62 (3) 66 (3)
Other 16 (3) 16 (3) 81 (4) 81 (4)
Do not know (%) 8 6 11 11
This table shows how money transfers (diﬀerent amounts) from the ECB or the government would on average be spent (in euros except for the last row,
which shows the percentage of respondents who respond ‘do not know’). The numbers in parentheses show the percentages of the total amount received.
N = 1110 for €500 transfer and N = 1113 for €2000 transfer. Diﬀerences between allocated amounts out of transfers from the ECB versus allocations out of
transfers from the government are all insigniﬁcant (based on a 5% signiﬁcance level).
Table 3. Allocation of helicopter transfer.
(Percentiles of weighted allocation distribution in euros)
Percentiles Save Spend Redeem debt Donate Invest Other
Panel A. Allocation of €500 transfer
5 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
10 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
25 25 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
50 200 (200) 150 (150) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
75 350 (350) 250 (250) 0 (0) 25 (25) 0 (0) 0 (0)
90 500 (500) 500 (500) 200 (200) 100 (100) 0 (0) 50 (50)
95 500 (500) 500 (500) 400 (300) 200 (200) 25 (20) 100 (100)
Panel B. Allocation of €2000 transfer
5 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
10 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
25 250 (300) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
50 1000 (1000) 500 (500) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
75 1000 (1200) 1000 (1000) 500 (500) 200 (200) 0 (0) 0 (0)
90 2000 (2000) 1000 (1000) 1000 (1000) 500 (500) 0 (0) 250 (300)
95 2000 (2000) 1500 (1500) 2000 (2000) 1000 (1000) 500 (500) 500 (500)
This table shows selected percentiles of the distribution among respondents on how money transfers (diﬀerent amounts) from the ECB or the government
would be spent. The numbers show the euro amounts for a money transfer from the ECB. The numbers in parentheses show the euro amounts for a similar
money transfer from the government.
4A lower marginal propensity to spend out of a highermoney transfer may be due to a higher number of liquidity constrained consumers overcoming this constraint as
shown by Christelis et al. (2018). It is also consistent with the concavity of the consumption function due to income uncertainty (Carroll and Kimball 1996).
APPLIED ECONOMICS 6177
Rooij, Lusardi, and Alessie 2011), the accumulation
of wealth (Van Rooij, Lusardi, and Alessie 2012), the
choice of saving accounts (Deuﬂhard, Georgarakos,
and Inderst 2019), the choice of mortgage products
(Van Ooijen and van Rooij 2016), and inﬂation
expectations (Van der Cruijsen, Jansen, and de
Haan 2015).
To investigate the relation between helicopter
transfers and knowledge, we have asked several
questions about respondents’ knowledge. See
Appendix 1 for the precise wording of the ques-
tions. First, we explained the term helicopter
money and asked whether respondents had
heard about helicopter money before. We have
done this because asking these questions without
explaining the concepts makes answers received
to these questions possibly unreliable, as people
may not really know what QE and helicopter
money are and still claim that they heard
about it. However, a drawback of this approach
is that it may be easier to recall hearing about
something (or believing that one has) when ﬁrst
being told about it. Nevertheless, few respon-
dents report having heard about these concepts.
It turns out this was only the case for 9% of the
respondents. It also turns out that the percen-
tage of the respondents who are aware of QE is
only slightly higher (12%). This low awareness is
consistent with the fact that the communication
strategy of central banks is primarily aimed at
ﬁnancial markets (Blinder et al. 2008). It is also
consistent with the way laymen appear to
acquire and process information (Hayo and
Neuenkirch 2018).
Figure 1. Distribution of allocation of €2000 transfer from ECB.
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In addition, we asked about the name of the pre-
sident of the ECB and the responsibilities of the ECB.
Almost 35% knows that Mario Draghi is the
President of the ECB. Furthermore, we asked about
the tasks and objectives of the ECB. The results show
that two-thirds of the respondents are aware that the
ECB is responsible for banking supervision. It turns
out that 41% of the respondents know that price
stability is among the monetary policy objectives of
the ECB, but only 26.4% correctly indicated that this
is the ECB’s main objective. These results are broadly
in line with the ﬁndings of Van der Cruijsen, Jansen,
and de Haan (2015).
Table 4 shows the relationship between respon-
dents’ knowledge and how they spend a €2000
transfer by the ECB.5 Knowledge is measured
using respondents’ answers to the questions out-
lined above. We use respondents’ estimates of the
current rate of inﬂation to proxy their knowledge
of the current economic situation. The median
respondent estimates current inﬂation in the
Netherlands at 1.2% which, at the time, was
−0.2%, while 3% of the respondents estimate cur-
rent inﬂation to be negative (both within the
group of the 55% of the respondents who
answered this question). We consider respondents
whose estimate is reasonably close – i.e. within
a range of plus or minus 1 percentage point
from the actual inﬂation rate – to have knowledge
about current inﬂation.
Figure 2. Distribution of allocation of €500 transfer from ECB.
5Given the small variation in allocation patterns in Table 2, we focus on the results of a €2000 money transfer by the ECB in the remainder of the paper. The
results for government transfers or a €500 money transfer by the ECB are available on request.
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Our results do not provide strong evidence
that knowledgeable respondents would spend
a lower or higher percentage of the transfer
received.6 The only signiﬁcant relationship is
between knowledge of the current inﬂation rate
and the choice to spend/save out of the money
transfer. Respondents who are aware of the cur-
rent level of inﬂation are more inclined to save
a larger part of the money transfer and spend
less, i.e. 21% of the total transfer compared to
28% for the whole sample.
The recent literature on consumption (discussed by
Muellbauer 2016) suggests that consumption does not
only depend on income but also on the level and
composition of households’ wealth. To investigate
the relationship between the respondents’ intended
allocation of a €2000 transfer by the ECB and their
ﬁnancial situation, we created tertiles for respondents
based on their personal income, householdnetwealth,
liquid assets as a percentage of total assets and dum-
mies for pension fund membership, home ownership
and having an ‘under water’mortgage, i.e. a mortgage
loan exceeding the value of the home.
Table 5, which reports bivariate relations, suggests
that respondents with low income or wealth levels
intend to spend a larger percentage of the transfer
while respondents with high income and wealth
intend to use a larger percentage to repay debt or
donate money. Similarly, homeowners intend to use
a larger percentage of the transfer to redeem debt –
and accordingly spend less – than respondents who
rent a house.7 Nevertheless, the diﬀerences between
the various groups of respondents are small and
mostly insigniﬁcant and the percentage of the transfer
that would be spent varies within a narrow range of
23% to 32%. In a multivariate regression analysis
where we simultaneously control for these income
and wealth measures in addition to some standard
socio-demographic characteristics (gender, age and
education) following previous studies like Jappelli
and Pistaferri (2014), Christelis et al. (2018), and
Fuster, Kaplan, and Zafar (2018), we also ﬁnd mostly
insigniﬁcant coeﬃcients (see Appendix 2).
Speciﬁcally, for spending, we ﬁnd a 5 percentage
points lowermarginal propensity to spend for respon-
dents with high net wealth (signiﬁcant at the 10%
level).
Would helicopter money aﬀect expectations?
In the questionnaire, we ask respondents how they
expect helicopter money would aﬀect economic
growth, inﬂation and wage increases, respectively.8
A similar question refers to the impact of QE. Note
that these questions were asked after explaining the
concepts of QE and helicopter money (see the ques-
tionnaire in Appendix 1). Table 6 reports the results.
Between 25% and 30% of the respondents expect
(much) higher inﬂation. This group of respondents
is twice as large as the group expecting (much) lower
inﬂation. Thus, on balance helicoptermoney seems to
slightly increase inﬂation expectations. However,
Table 4. The impact of knowledge on allocation of €2000 transfer from ECB.
(Weighted average allocation in euros; percentages of total amount in parentheses)
Respondents who . . . Save Spend Redeem debt Donate Invest Other DK (%)
Heard about helicopter money 714 (36) 585 (29) 329 (16) 180 (9) 155** (8) 38 (2) 6
Heard about QE 757 (38) 485 (24) 321 (16) 174 (9) 219** (11) 44 (2) 4
Knows name of ECB President 772* (39) 536 (27) 346 (17) 168 (8) 106** (5) 70 (4) 8
Knows price stability main objective ECB 812 (41) 569 (28) 310 (15) 137 (7) 106** (5) 68 (3) 5
Knows ECB responsible for bank supervision 810 (40) 560 (28) 333 (17) 164 (8) 54 (3) 80 (4) 5
Knows current inﬂation rate 935* (47) 427** (21) 270 (14) 176 (9) 145** (7) 47 (2) 4
This table shows how a €2000 helicopter transfer from the ECB would on average be spent by diﬀerent subgroups of respondents (in euros except for the
last column, which shows the percentage of respondents who respond DK = ‘do not know’). The numbers in parentheses show the percentages of the
total amount received. N = 1113. Stars denote a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in allocated amounts for the knowledgeable respondents versus those without
knowledge; ** p < 0.01 and * p < 0.05.
6For 5 out of 6 proxies for knowledge, we ﬁnd that respondents with knowledge allocate a signiﬁcant higher percentage of the €2000 money transfer to
investments than respondents without knowledge. This is consistent with the relation between ﬁnancial knowledge and stock market participation (Van
Rooij, Lusardi, and Alessie 2011). However, also knowledgeable respondents use only a small percentage of the money transfer for investments.
7Falling home prices in the aftermath of the ﬁnancial crisis in combination with the custom of ﬁrst-time buyers to take out high mortgages (see Van Ooijen
and van Rooij 2016) resulted in many homeowners facing loan to value ratios of over 100% with an interest in redeeming mortgage debt. Indeed, debt
redemption is an important motive for saving in the Netherlands (Le Blanc et al. 2016).
8Arguably, respondents may ﬁnd expectation questions on macroeconomic variables diﬃcult to answer. However, Dräger, Lamla, and Pfajfar (2016)
document that a substantial share of consumers reports macroeconomic expectations that are consistent with important economic concepts such as the
Fisher equation, the Taylor rule and the Phillips curve.
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according to the respondents, helicopter money
would primarily aﬀect economic growth expectations.
Almost half of the respondents expect helicopter
money to increase economic growth (but a small
group foresees lower economic growth).Most respon-
dents expect no impact on wages. The ING study
reports similar results for the European consumer,
i.e. helicopter money would more often aﬀect eco-
nomic growth expectations than inﬂation expecta-
tions (Bright and Janssen 2017). However, for the
Dutch respondents in their survey, the group expect-
ing higher inﬂation (4 in 10 respondents) is roughly
equal in size as the group expecting higher economic
growth.
Table 5. The impact of income and wealth on allocation of €2000 transfer from ECB.
(Weighted average allocation in euros; percentages of total amount in parentheses)
Save Spend Redeem debt Donate Invest Other DK (%)
Income
– Low 867 (43) 601 (30) 221 (11) 172 (9) 40 (2) 99 (5) 16
– Intermediate 806 (40) 535 (27) 354**(18) 158 (8) 41 (2) 106(5) 10
– High 807 (40) 526 (26) 392**(20) 130 (7) 105**(5) 40**(2) 5
Net wealth
– Low 842 (42) 575 (29) 269 (13) 128 (6) 76 (4) 110(6) 17
– Intermediate 844 (42) 549 (27) 289 (14) 187 (9) 63 (3) 68 (3) 10
– High 737 (37) 456*(23) 383*(19) 259**(13) 107(5) 58*(3) 8
Liquid assets
– Low 776 (39) 502 (25) 420 (21) 192 (10) 62 (3) 49 (2) 15
– Intermediate 765 (38) 494 (25) 383 (19) 170 (9) 90 (5) 97*(5) 8
– High 880 (44) 586 (29) 139** (7) 212 (11) 92 (5) 90 (5) 13
Pension fund member
– No 819 (41) 546 (27) 264 (13) 212 (11) 60 (3) 99 (5) 12
– Yes 803 (40) 535 (27) 345 (17) 163 (8) 83 (4) 70 (4) 12
Home owner
– No 837 (42) 633 (32) 245 (12) 131 (7) 61 (3) 92 (5) 11
– Yes 823 (41) 511**(26) 362**(18) 166 (8) 63 (3) 75 (4) 11
Under water mortgage
– No 811 (41) 535 (27) 294 (15) 198 (10) 82 (4) 81 (4) 11
– Yes 817 (41) 548 (27) 434 (20) 67**(3) 43 (2) 92 (5) 22
This table shows how a €2000 helicopter transfer from the ECB would on average be spent by diﬀerent subgroups of respondents (in euros except for the
last column, which shows the percentage of respondents who respond DK = ‘do not know’). The numbers in parentheses show the percentages of the
total amount received. Stars denote a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in allocated amounts if compared to the ﬁrst subgroup of each item (i.e. low income, low net
wealth, low liquid assets, no pension fund member, no home owner and no underwater mortgage); ** p < 0.01 and * p < 0.05.
Table 6. Perceived impact of helicopter money and QE.
(Weighted percentages of respondents)
€500 received from ECB
(1)
€500 received from government
(2)
€2000 received from ECB
(3)




Panel A. Perceived consequences for inﬂation
Much lower 1.3 1.0 0.6 0.5 0.7
Lower 13.0 14.3 12.5 12.1 10.9
Stays equal 37.4 38.2 34.2 34.2 23.8
Higher 26.3 25.6 26.0 28.4 18.1
Much higher 1.1 0.8 1.7 1.6 1.0
Do not know 21.0 20.3 25.0 23.2 45.4
Panel B. Perceived consequences for economic growth
Much lower 1.2 1.5 0.8 0.9 0.4
Lower 7.6 7.3 5.1 7.8 6.2
Stays equal 29.6 28.9 25.2 24.9 22.5
Higher 43.5 44.2 47.9 46.5 26.5
Much higher 1.4 2.0 1.5 2.0 0.4
Do not know 16.7 16.2 19.4 17.9 44.0
Panel C. Perceived consequences for wages
Much lower 1.0 1.2 1.6 1.9 0.8
Lower 13.0 12.0 10.0 8.4 7.9
Stays equal 62.0 62.4 58.8 61.2 40.5
Higher 8.1 8.4 9.2 9.3 6.9
Much higher 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1
Do not know 16.1 15.9 20.2 19.0 43.8
#
observations
1110 1110 1113 1113 2223
This table shows the respondents’ perception of the impact of transfers on inﬂation, economic growth and wages for diﬀerent transfers (€500 and €2000)
provided by the ECB and the government and the impact of QE by the ECB. Due to rounding the percentages may not sum to 100.
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Comparing the perceived impact of QE and heli-
copter money, respectively, on inﬂation, economic
growth and wages, we ﬁnd some interesting simila-
rities and diﬀerences. Similar to our ﬁndings for
helicopter money, more respondents expect
a positive impact of QE on economic growth than
on inﬂation. However, compared to helicopter
money expectations for all economic variables are
less aﬀected by QE; almost half of the respondents
report not to know what to expect from QE. Most
likely, the channels through which central bank pur-
chases of securities aﬀect the economy are less
appealing to the public than the transmission chan-
nels of money transfers. Indeed, further analysis
reveals that respondents who have heard about QE
are more likely to expect an increase in inﬂation as
a consequence of QE (results available on request).
Trust in the ECB
Compared to other European and national insti-
tutions, many people put high trust in the ECB (cf.
Ehrmann, Soudan, and Stracca 2013). However,
trust in the ECB has declined after the onset of
the ﬁnancial crisis (Wälti 2012; Bursian and Fürth
2015). This is worrisome because trust in ECB
supports the anchoring of inﬂation expectations
around the ECB target of below but close to 2%
(Christelis et al. 2016). A concern about QE and
helicopter money is that these measures may
further undermine the public’s conﬁdence in the
ECB. Table 7 shows the impact of several factors
on respondents’ trust in the ECB.9 The results
suggest that the eﬀect of helicopter money on
public trust in the ECB is ambiguous. Helicopter
money increases trust in ECB for almost 1 in 5
respondents, but decreases trust for 1 in 5
respondents as well. For the large majority, heli-
copter money does not change trust or respon-
dents do not know yet whether their trust in the
ECB would be aﬀected.
The results suggest that ECB policies to purchase
government and corporate debt reduce trust in the
ECB somewhat more than does helicopter money.
For instance, 23% of the respondents state that buy-
ing government debt lowers their trust in the ECB,
compared to 16% reporting increased trust. These
percentages are 30 and 13 respectively if we ask for
the eﬀect on trust if the ECB buys corporate debt. An
additional adverse eﬀect on trust in the ECB would
occur if QE leads to negative interest rates on con-
sumer savings accounts. Also, negative mortgage
rates would lower trust in the ECB. Conversely, the
asset quality review of banks by the ECB had
a positive impact on trust.
One might argue that these ﬁndings reﬂect a lack
of understanding of what helicoptermoney does and
that the attitudes of respondents would become
more positive when they are informed about the
purpose of helicopter money. While we did not per-
form this experiment, the data allow us to explore
the support for helicopter money among those who
are more knowledgeable (i.e. are familiar with the
terms helicopter money or QE).We ﬁnd that among
the knowledgeable the eﬀect of helicopter money on
trust is signiﬁcantly more negative than in the whole
sample. Speciﬁcally, helicopter money would reduce
trust in the ECB for 46% of knowledgeable respon-
dents (results available on request).
Discussion
There are several issues that need to be taken into
account in interpreting our ﬁndings. First, in the
survey, we do not explicitly consider the prevailing
economic circumstances at the time when the survey
was conducted. Therefore, it is likely that the survey
respondents answered the questions while consider-
ing their current economic circumstances. When the
survey was conducted (13 to 24 May 2016) the Dutch
economy was slowly recovering from the fall-out of
the ﬁnancial crisis and the European sovereign debt
crisis. Recovery was slower than in some other
Table 7. What is the eﬀect on trust in the ECB of . . .. ?.
(Weighted percentages of respondents)
Less Equal More Do not know
Helicopter money 17.7 37.4 18.7 26.2
Buying government debt 23.2 30.6 15.7 30.5
Buying corporate debt 30.2 26.1 12.8 30.9
Review asset quality banks 7.3 28.2 33.1 31.5
Negative interest savings accounts 50.0 14.0 4.1 31.9
Negative mortgage interest rates 35.3 19.5 7.6 37.6
Percentages may not sum to 100 due to rounding. N = 2223.
9Following previous studies, we did not provide respondents with a deﬁnition of trust. So respondents might have very diﬀerent notions of “trust” when
answering to the survey. In particular, it is important to note that our survey does not ask whether respondents trust that the ECB delivers on its mandate.
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European countries like Germany. Still, at the time,
the Netherlands were not in a recession any more. It
seems likely that under more stressed economic cir-
cumstances consumers would spend more and that
our results may, therefore, be attenuated by the pre-
vailing, relatively strong economic conditions.
Second, we have focused on whether or not con-
sumers would spend the money received. However,
if people spend unexpected money transfers on dur-
ables, this may be considered as savings since part of
the durables bought otherwise would be consumed
at a later point in time. Indeed, as pointed out above,
the results of Kuhn et al. (2011) suggest that Dutch
citizens‘ consumption responds little following
unanticipated transitory income shocks, such as lot-
tery wins, as most of the windfall income received is
spent on durables.10 We have not asked respondents
how they intend to spend the money, as we believe
that whether or not people would spend the money
determines the macroeconomic impact of
a helicopter drop, no matter whether it would be
spent on durables or non-durables.11
Third, our results suggest that a small part of
the money received under a helicopter drop would
be donated. We decided to include this category to
have a more complete picture of the answer
options, as respondents may be more willing to
use an unexpected windfall than regular income
sources for donations to e.g. charity. As to the
results: on the one hand, this outcome seems to
give the answers more credibility as the answers
given are likely quite honest. On the other hand, it
may lead to an underestimate of the marginal
propensity to spend if the money donated would
be spent by the receiver. However, even if we
assume that also money donated would be fully
spent, our results do not suggest that the marginal
propensity to spend out of a helicopter drop is
between about 40% and 60% as suggested by
Muellbauer (2014). Nevertheless, the total impact
on aggregate spending may be larger than the
immediate impact found in our survey if house-
holds would spend part of the savings out of the
helicopter transfer in the longer term.
Respondents who indicate that they will save the
money might spend it after a couple of months
when they are confronted with an unexpected
expense. Such cases would increase the impact
on spending if respondents otherwise could not
have aﬀorded this expense.
Fourth, it has been argued that in surveys like
ours the order of asking questions may aﬀect the
outcomes. However, our experience with rando-
mizing answer options in this sort of questions
in internet surveys is that ordering eﬀects do not
play a role. We found it more important to
randomize the order of questions referring to
the institute ‘ECB’ versus ‘government’ and the
size of the amount ‘€500’ versus ‘€2000’. In both
cases, the results showed no question order
eﬀects on responses. Note further, that the
order of the answers in these questions is such
that the ﬁrst option is ‘donate’ and the last
option is ‘other’. While these options are suspi-
cious to gaining higher weight by respondents
(due to primacy or recency eﬀects), these options
were given a non-zero number only infrequently.
Moreover, respondents were shown a table on
the screen with all six options and had to ﬁll in
an amount for each of these options (which
amounts had to sum up to the total amount)
which makes response order eﬀects less likely.
Fifth, would respondents tell the truth and
would they behave in the same way as they report
in our survey? Carlsson and Kataria (2018) test
a self-commitment mechanism where survey
respondents are asked to promise to answer the
survey questions truthfully. They ﬁnd that diﬀer-
ences between answers given in surveys with and
without this promise are rather small. Likewise,
there is evidence suggesting that respondents often
behave as they say they would. For instance, sur-
vey measures of risk tolerance have been shown to
predict risky health behaviour such as smoking
and drinking (Barsky et al. 1997). Other examples
include Hurd, van Rooij, and Winter (2011) who
show that respondents with expectations of posi-
tive stock market returns are more likely to enter
10We have not asked how respondents would spend lottery wins, but Djuric and Neugart (2016) ﬁnd that in all policy treatments for helicopter money
people consider helicopter money as a windfall and spend the same amount they would spend out of a lottery win.
11Christelis et al. (2018) ask Dutch respondents how they would allocate a one-time bonus equal to one month or three months of income over four possible
categories (saving, repaying debt, purchasing non-durables and purchasing durables) in the next 12 months. They ﬁnd that total spending out of this
windfall gain equals 37–39% of the bonus. While the diﬀerence is not very large, total spending is somewhat higher than in our survey, which may be
related to the explicit distinction between durables and non-durables.
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the stock market or Hurd, Smith, and
Zissimopoulos (2004) who show that self-reports
on longevity are predictive for the decision when
to claim retirement beneﬁts in the US. In a more
recent example, Armantier et al. (2015) document
evidence from incentivised experiments of indivi-
duals who act in line with their inﬂation expecta-
tions as reported in earlier surveys. Nevertheless,
consumers may spend more than they plan
upfront or respondents may change their mind if
unanticipated shocks occur. Sahm, Shapiro, and
Slemrod (2010) investigate the reliability of survey
reports on intended spending before a US tax
rebate by re-interviewing the respondents
a couple of months after they had received the
rebate. In both surveys, about a ﬁfth of the respon-
dents indicated to spend or have spent most of the
rebate. Indeed, comparing individual responses,
the majority of respondents had acted upon their
intentions. Among respondents who switched to
more or to less spending in the second survey,
personal circumstances were the most reported
cause for this switch. Thus, in absence of econ-
omy-wide, unanticipated shocks aﬀecting many
consumers in a similar way, actual spending
quite accurately matched intended spending.
Finally, to what extent are the results of our survey
among Dutch citizens representative for the euro
area as a whole? As pointed out before, the results
of two other recent studies are close to our ﬁndings.
Bright and Janssen (2017) report that in their survey
among citizens of 12 European countries only 26%
of the respondents say they would spendmost of the
money. The marginal propensity to spend reported
by Djuric and Neugart (2016) based on a survey
among German citizens is somewhat higher (40%).
V. Concluding comments
There are many proclaimed pros and cons of heli-
copter money. According to Turner (2015), ‘we
should recognize that there is an undoubted techni-
cal case for using monetary ﬁnance in some circum-
stances, and now address the political issue of how to
make ensure that it will only be used in appropriate
circumstances and appropriately moderate quanti-
ties.’ In our view, support among European policy-
makers for the idea seems extremely low at the
moment of writing, no matter whether the drop
would be done by the ECB or national governments.
The latter option may be even more problematic
than the ﬁrst in view of the prohibition of monetary
ﬁnancing of government spending by the ECB. Still,
when the next recession will hit and unconventional
policies like those currently used are considered
insuﬃcient, views among policymakers may change.
In a survey in the Netherlands, we have asked
participants how they would allocate a transfer
received from either the ECB or the national govern-
ment; to examine whether the size of the transfer
matters, we asked the same question for two amounts
of the transfer (€500 and €2000). Note that a money
transfer of €2000 to every citizen aged 18 years or
older in the 19 euro-area countries would sum to
a total amount of about €550 billion which is about
equivalent to the total amount of securities purchased
under EAPP within a seven-month period (that is in
the period that monthly purchases equalled
€80 billion). Our ﬁndings suggest that only a part of
this money transfer would actually be spent. Also,
helicopter money would have a limited direct impact
on inﬂation expectations among the public. Given the
limited eﬀects on spending, second round eﬀects on
inﬂation expectations would most likely be limited as
well.
The impact of unconventional monetary policy
on trust in the ECB seems mixed (in the case of
helicopter money) or somewhat negative (for QE).
It thus seems that the public does not consider
helicopter money and QE as eﬀective measures to
increase inﬂation. Indeed, most respondents indi-
cate that they do not raise their inﬂation expecta-
tions in response to these measures.
Our results show that respondents expect to spend
about 30% of the money transfer instead of using the
full amount to increase spending. Should we be sur-
prised by this marginal propensity to spend (MPS)
level? On the one hand, stylized theoretical models
suggest a much lower MPS of 3–5% out of transitory
income shocks. On the other hand, more realistic
models incorporating liquidity constraints and pre-
cautionary saving as well as many of the empirical
estimates in the literature, among others based on tax
rebates, are broadly in line with our ﬁndings (for an
overview see, e.g. Jappelli and Pistaferri 2010, 2014).
Our ﬁnding that the impact of a helicopter trans-
fer is very similar for transfers coming from the ECB
or the government runs against the view of
6184 M. VAN ROOIJ AND J. DE HAAN
Muellbauer (2014). Consequently, if central banks
were to consider helicopter money, there would be
no need in terms of eﬀectiveness for the ECB to
distribute the money transfers rather than channel
these transfers through the governments. In fact,
given the resemblance of helicopter money and ﬁscal
policy it may be preferable that ﬁscal authorities
transfer the helicopter money.
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Appendix 1. The Survey
Below, we explain the structure and precise wording of the
most important questions in our survey.
Structure of the questionnaire
Our sample of respondents was randomly split into four
groups. Group 1 was oﬀered question Q1a, group 2 was
oﬀered question Q1b, and so forth. Note that respondents
could cross an ‘I do not know’ option when answering this
question. Next, all respondents answer question Q2.
Thereafter, each group was oﬀered a similar question as in
Q1a-d, but now with ‘European Central Bank’ replaced by
‘government’ and vice versa. Next, all respondents answer
a question similar to question Q2 and all questions thereafter
are oﬀered to all respondents as well.
Wording of questions
The question numbers refer to the actual order in the survey.
Q1a) Imagine that the European Central Bank (ECB) depos-
its €500 on the bank account of each citizen aged 18 years
and older in the euro area. What would you do with this
money?
Please divide €500 between the following categories:
- Donate (e.g. to a good cause or relative)
- Spend on groceries, furniture, vehicles, trips, vacation or
other expenses
- Put aside (e.g. on a savings account)
- Invest (e.g. in stocks)
- Redeem mortgage or other debt
- Other
Q1b) Imagine that the European Central Bank (ECB)
deposits €2000 on the bank account of each citizen aged 18
years and older in the euro area. What would you do with
this money?
Please divide €2000 between the following categories:
- Donate (e.g. to a good cause or relative)
- Spend on groceries, furniture, vehicles, trips, vacation or
other expenses
- Put aside (e.g. on a savings account)
- Invest (e.g. in stocks)
- Redeem mortgage or other debt
- Other
Q1c) Imagine that the government of each country in the euro
area deposits €500 on the bank account of each citizen aged 18
years and older in the euro area. What would you do with this
money?
Please divide €500 between the following categories:
- Donate (e.g. to a good cause or relative)
- Spend on groceries, furniture, vehicles, trips, vacation or
other expenses
- Put aside (e.g. on a savings account)
- Invest (e.g. in stocks)
- Redeem mortgage or other debt
- Other
Q1d) Imagine that the government of each country in the euro
area deposits €2000 on the bank account of each citizen aged 18
years and older in the euro area. What would you do with this
money?
Please divide €2000 between the following categories:
- Donate (e.g. to a good cause or relative)
- Spend on groceries, furniture, vehicles, trips, vacation or
other expenses
- Put aside (e.g. on a savings account)
- Invest (e.g. in stocks)
- Redeem mortgage or other debt
- Other
Q2) What do you think are the consequences of this measure
for economic growth, inﬂation and wages of employees? DK = I
do not know
Q3a-Q3d) similar to Q1a-Q1d, but now with ‘European Central
Bank’ replaced by ‘government of each country in the euro area’
and vice versa (see above for a description of the structure of the
survey)
Q4) is identical to Q2
Q5) Money deposited by the European Central Bank (ECB) on
citizens’ bank accounts (directly or via the government) is called




Q6) The European Central Bank (ECB) purchases govern-
ment bonds (government debt) as of March 2015 and will
start purchasing corporate bonds (corporate debt) on the
ﬁnancial markets soon. This is called quantitative easing.




Q7) is identical to Q2
Much
lower Lower Equal Higher
Much
higher DK
Economic growth is. [] [] [] [] [] []
Inﬂation is. [] [] [] [] [] []
Wages are. [] [] [] [] [] []
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Q8) For you personally, do the measures or developments
below lead to less, equal or more trust in the European
Central Bank (ECB)?
Q9) Who is the president of the European Central Bank
(ECB)? We are interested in your ﬁrst thought. You do not
need to be sure about your answer and you are not supposed











[] I do not know
Q10)What are the main goals and tasks of the European Central
Bank (ECB)?We are interested in your ﬁrst thought. You do not
need to be sure about your answer and you are not supposed to
look up the answer. You may cross multiple answers.




[] Supervision of banks
[] I do not know
Q11) What do you think is the current rate of inﬂation in the
Netherlands? If you think the inﬂation rate is negative, you
can provide a negative percentage using the minus sign (-).
You may provide a percentage answer up to 1 digit after the
comma. Please provide an estimate if you are not sure about
your answer. You are not supposed to look up the answer.
[] . percent
[] I do not know
Appendix 2. Multivariate Regressions
Instead of the bivariate statistics for the allocation of the €2000
helicopter transfer across various income and wealth subgroups
reported in Table 5, Table A1 presents a multivariate regression
analysis where we simultaneously control for these income and
wealth measures in addition to standard socio-demographic




Depositing money on citizens’ bank
accounts
[] [] [] []
Purchasing government debt [] [] [] []
Purchasing corporate debt [] [] [] []
Review asset quality banks (as part of the
European supervision of banks)
[] [] [] []
Negative interest savings accounts [] [] [] []
Negative mortgage interest rates [] [] [] []
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Table A1. Multivariate analysis of the allocation of €2000 transfer from ECB.
Save Spend Redeem debt Donate Invest Other
Male −0.021 0.0095 −0.0085 0.039*** −0.031** 0.011
(0.030) (0.023) (0.024) (0.0098) (0.016) (0.010)
Age: < 40 years 0.046 0.0050 −0.037 −0.012 −0.0028 0.00041
(0.041) (0.032) (0.036) (0.017) (0.021) (0.010)
Age: ≥65 years 0.0079 −0.025 −0.031 −0.023* 0.061*** 0.0097
(0.029) (0.024) (0.026) (0.013) (0.018) (0.0094)
Education: low −0.025 0.0073 −0.025 −0.0072 0.032 0.018
(0.034) (0.026) (0.029) (0.015) (0.020) (0.012)
Education: high 0.0065 −0.0034 −0.015 −0.0057 0.014 0.0035
(0.032) (0.026) (0.029) (0.015) (0.018) (0.0082)
Income: low −0.0039 0.0096 −0.049* 0.0069 0.0039 0.033**
(0.037) (0.029) (0.029) (0.011) (0.024) (0.015)
Income: high 0.0068 −0.0072 −0.0075 0.028** −0.0094 −0.011
(0.031) (0.026) (0.028) (0.012) (0.019) (0.0080)
Net wealth: low −0.0027 −0.011 0.055* 0.013 −0.079*** 0.025**
(0.045) (0.037) (0.032) (0.025) (0.030) (0.013)
Net wealth: high −0.028 −0.050* 0.048 0.015 0.031 −0.017
(0.032) (0.027) (0.030) (0.015) (0.021) (0.011)
Liquid assets: low −0.0068 −0.0078 0.035 −0.016 0.018 −0.023***
(0.032) (0.025) (0.033) (0.014) (0.018) (0.0086)
Liquid assets: high 0.092 0.016 −0.19*** 0.029 0.073 −0.024**
(0.057) (0.046) (0.028) (0.027) (0.050) (0.0097)
Pension fund member −0.0094 0.0013 0.017 0.0025 −0.019 0.0072
(0.030) (0.023) (0.027) (0.012) (0.019) (0.011)
Home owner 0.037 −0.0054 −0.060 0.029 0.0032 −0.0043
(0.063) (0.052) (0.037) (0.031) (0.056) (0.012)
Under water mortgage 0.041 −0.036 0.014 −0.0063 0.017 −0.029***
(0.060) (0.051) (0.064) (0.034) (0.027) (0.011)
Intercept 0.37*** 0.28*** 0.26*** −0.016 0.076 0.026
(0.077) (0.062) (0.053) (0.029) (0.065) (0.021)
This table reports coeﬃcients from OLS regressions of the individual allocations of a €2000 transfer from the ECB as a percentage of the total transfer on
individual sociodemographic characteristics (gender, age and education) together with the income and wealth variables. All explanatory variables are
dummy variables. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; N= 738; *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05 and * p< 0.10.
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